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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1978, a Nevada Federal District Court permitted the
Nevada Real Estate Advisory Commission to regulate the registered
service mark' of Century 21, a national franchisor of real estate bro-
1. Century 21's service mark was a "modern building logo bordered on top with the words
'Century 21.'" Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Nevada Real Estate Advisory Comm'n, 448 F.
Supp. 1237, 1239 (D. Nev. 1978), affid mem., 440 U.S. 941, superseded by 15 U.S.C. § 1121(b)
(1994). For purposes of convenience, this Note will use the terms "trademark" and "mark" to
include both service marks and trademarks. These terms are often used interchangeably. See,
e.g., FORUM ON FRANCHISING, A.B.A., THE FRANCHISE TRADEMARK HANDBOOK: DEVELOPING AND
PROTECTING YouR TRADEMARKS AND SERVICE MARKS 2 (Louis T. Pirkey ed., 1994) ('The term
mark includes both trademarks and service marks. However, laypeople (and even lawyers) often
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kerage firms.' Prior to this state regulation, Century 21's mark occu-
pied approximately 80 percent of the surface area of any given display,
while the name of the local franchisee covered the remaining 20
percent.3 To prevent consumer confusion," the Commission required
that the 80:20 ratio be changed to a 50:50 ratio, effectively making the
franchisee's logo as large as its counterpart. Century 21 objected to
this mandate, arguing in part that such a regulation would dilute its
registered mark and thereby violate the Lanham Act.6 The Court
rejected this argument by holding that the regulation fell squarely
within the purposes of the Lanham Act.'
After the Nevada decision, other states adopted similar regula-
tions.8 Ultimately, however, courts found these rules burdensome on
the franchisor-franchisee relationship and invalidated the regulation
use the term trademark to refer to both trademarks and service marks."); SECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, A.B.A., WHAT IS A TRADEMARK? 2 (1995) (explaining that
trademark law defines service marks and trademarks in a similar way). In any event, these
distinctions have no bearing on the argument herein presented.
Trademark is defined by the Lanham Act as: "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof (1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use
in commerce... to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source
in unknown." 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
2. See Century 21, 448 F. Supp. at 1239.
3. See id. The trademark registration on file with the Patent and Trademark Office
accurately reflected this 80:20 ratio. See H.R. REP. No. 97-778, at 1 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2621, 2621.
4. While the court never directly cites to any explicit purpose for the Commission's
regulation, it alludes to it in its discussion of the Lanham Act and, to a certain extent, renders it
implicit in its final holding. See Century 21, 448 F. Supp. at 1241; see also infra note 7.
5. Section VI of the Rules and Regulations of the Nevada Real Estate Advisory
Commission states, in part, that "(4) Any broker who operates under or uses a franchise name
shall: ... (b) incorporate in the franchise name and logotype his own name; however, the broker's
name may not be less than 50 percent of the surface area of the entire combined area...."
Century 21, 448 F. Supp. at 1239. This regulation applied to all modes and mediums of the
mark's display: "signs, letterheads, business cards, brochures, uniforms, name tags, folders,
checks, forms, memo pads, desk plates, display materials, marketing materials, advertisements,
etc." Payless ShoeSource, Inc. v. Town of Penfield, 934 F. Supp. 540, 543 (W.D.N.Y. 1996)
(discussing Century 21).
6. See Century 21, 448 F. Supp. at 1241. The Lanham Act, also known as the Trademark
Act of 1946, established a nationwide system for trademark registration. See HARRY AUBREY
TOULMIN, JR., TRADE-MARK ACT OF 1946, at 5-6 (1946). See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127.
7. See Century 21, 448 F. Supp. at 1241. The court noted that the purpose of the Lanham
Act was twofold: "first, to ensure that the public gets what it thinks it is getting when it buys a
name brand; and second, to protect trademark holders from pirates and cheats." Id. (citing S.
REP. No. 1333 (1946)).
8. See H.R. REP. No. 97-778, at 1 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N 2621, 2621.
9. '"These rules inhibited nationwide advertising campaigns, increased costs, and made the
franchisor-franchisee relationship less appealing." Payless ShoeSource, 934 F. Supp. at 543.
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In addition, some states "considered and rejected such rules as being
anticompetitive, arbitrary, and onerous.""
Subsequently, Congress amended the Lanham Act with the
passage of § 1121(b)." Section 1121(b) consists of two clauses: the first
prohibits any state or political subdivision from "altering" a registered
mark and the second forbids states from requiring additional marks
from being incorporated into the original mark.' While Congress's
solution to the aftereffects of Century 21 apparently embodies both
clauses of § 1121(b), the Ninth Circuit in Blockbuster Videos, Inc. v.
City of Tempe described only the second clause as the remedy and thus
rendered the first clause a rider." Effectively, the court not only ex-
panded § 1121(b) beyond the facts of Century 21, but it left unclear the
extent to which the Lanham Act preempts municipal zoning or-
dinances.
This issue is especially poignant when municipalities enact
aesthetic-based"' zoning ordinances that deny exterior sign permits to
vendors who desire to display their federally registered trademarks on
their storefront signs."5 Invariably, such ordinances create a conflict
between the federal government's interest in regulating trademarks
and the states' traditional police powers in governing the use of prop-
erty. As discussed in Part II, constitutional law generally recognizes
"that a town, pursuant to its police power, may impose sign restric-
10. H.R. REP. No. 97-778, at 1, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2621, 2621.
11. The amendment provides that:
No state or other jurisdiction of the United States or any political subdivision or any
agency thereof may require alteration of a registered mark, or require that additional
trademarks, service marks, trade names, or corporate names that may be associated with
or incorporated into the registered mark be displayed in the mark in a manner differing
from the display of such additional trademarks, service marks, trade names, or corporate
names contemplated by the registered mark as exhibited in the certificate of registration
issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
15 U.S.C. § 1121(b); see also Payless ShoeSource, 934 F. Supp. at 542-43 (noting that § 1121(b) is
commonly referred to as the "Century 21" amendment). This amendment will hereinafter be
referred to as "§ 1121(b)."
12. See 15 U.S.C. § 1121(b).
13. See Blockbuster Videos, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 141 F.3d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir. 1998). The
court noted that since the first clause was not necessary to address the post-Century 21
franchisor-franchisee relationship, it is "apparent, therefore, that Congress added [it] to cover
situations in which a state, local political subdivision, or agency might require other types of
changes in a registered mark." Id.
14. Aesthetic-based zoning laws refer to regulations whose primary purpose is maintaining
exterior uniformity. See infra Part II.
15. For the purposes of this Note, "to display" is defined as using a storefront sign or similar
construction in order to convey or deliver the registered mark to the consumer. "Vendor" is
herein defined as anyone who possesses a registered mark and wishes to display that mark on an
exterior sign.
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tions in order to regulate aesthetics."1 On the other hand, case law
also weighs heavily in favor of protecting the value of registered
trademarks. Whether the latter preempts the former depends, in
part, on whether the clauses of § 1121(b) are read separately or
together."
Since judicial opinion remains divided over the answer to this
question and until Congress acts to clarify this two-clause structure,9
this Note articulates a narrow interpretation of § 1121(b) and encour-
ages that its application be restricted to situations that are substan-
tially similar to Century 21. To that end, Part II of this Note explores
the validity of municipal zoning power, and, in particular, discusses
two overlapping constitutional issues within which this police power
has evolved. Against this backdrop, Part HI argues that § 1121(b) and
its legislative history support limited preemption of aesthetic-based
zoning laws. 2 In addition, this section explains the shortcomings of
the Ninth Circuit's statutory interpretation in Blockbuster Videos, Inc.
v. City of Tempe. Finally, Part IV sets forth a definition of alteration
that effectively prevents the application of § 1121(b) to marks that are
incidentally affected by aesthetic-based zoning regulations.2
II. THE POWER TO ZONE: AN EVOLVING LICENSE
In Blockbuster, although the Ninth Circuit never explicitly ex-
amined the evolution of municipal zoning power, its ultimate rejection
16. Payless ShoeSource, 934 F. Supp. at 542 (citing People v. Goodman, 290 N.E.2d 139, 141
(N.Y. 1972)).
This Note incorporates historical preservation within the meaning of aesthetic-based
regulation. Zoning regulation based on historical preservation is inherently similar to aesthetic-
based regulation in that it seeks to maintain what is aesthetically pleasing, albeit from a more
cultural perspective. See generally Gregory A. Ashe, Reflecting the Best of our Aspirations:
Protecting Modern and Post-Modern Architecture, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 69 (1997).
17. See supra note 7 (explaining the purpose of trademark law).
18. See Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1299 (noting that only the second clause is relevant and
holding that § 1211(b) preempted the aesthetic-based zoning regulation).
19. "[T]here appears to be a paucity of case law interpreting § 1121(b)" within the context of
aesthetic-based zoning laws that regulate exterior signs. Payless ShoeSource, 934 F. Supp. at
545. Currently, only two circuit courts have reviewed this narrow issue. See Lisa's Party City,
Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 185 F.3d 12 (2d Cir. 1999); Blockbuster, 141 F.3d 1295. To the extent
that minimal case law on this dispute currently exists, Congress may await further judicial
scrutiny before taking action.
20. See infra Part III.
21. Incidentally affected marks are the result of aesthetic-based zoning laws that regulate
exterior signage and in no way damage or threaten acceptable use of the registered mark.
Effectively, ma'rks that are incidentally affected by such laws do not compromise their validity.
See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
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of aesthetic-based zoning regulations reflected a traditional view.'
Historically, courts were even averse to aesthetic-connected zoning
laws," concluding that aesthetic considerations did not constitute a
valid concern of municipal police powers.' Loosely defined, these
powers were consistently limited to laws that directly related to the
safety, health, morals and general welfare of the public.' Thus, aes-
thetic-connected zoning regulations necessarily required attachment
to laws that were substantially grounded within the traditional limits
of the states' police powers."6 Gradually, however, this traditional view
was replaced by a judicial posture favoring aesthetic concerns, as a
number of jurisdictions began to uphold not only aesthetic-connected
zoning laws, but aesthetic-based zoning laws as well." Even today, as
22. See Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1298 (pointing to the clear language of the statute as the
basis for rejecting Tempe's argument). While it was perhaps unnecessary for the Blockbuster
court to address in great detail the significance of a municipality's police powers, the Ninth
Circuit's otherwise obvious respect for a community's aesthetic values should have provoked at
least minimal discussion. See Christopher Neumann, Note, FCC Preemption of Zoning
Ordinances that Restrict Satellite Dish Antenna Placement: Sound Policy or Legislative Overkill?,
71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 635, 641 (1997). In 1992, the Ninth Circuit held that certain zoning
requirements for satellite dishes were valid regulation in furthering a "city's interest in aesthetic
values." See Johnson v. City of Pleasanton, 982 F.2d 350, 354 (9th Cir. 1992).
23. Aesthetic-connected zoning laws, separate from aesthetic-based, are those that anchor
aesthetic considerations with other more legitimate justifications for the exercise of municipal
police powers. See infra note 27 (highlighting more legitimate considerations).
24. See Ashe, supra note 16, at 74; see also ALEXANDRA D. DAWSON, LAND-USE PLANNING
AND THE LAW 141 (1982) ("Early legal decisions were unfavorable to the right of governmental
bodies to limit the private use of land for aesthetic reasons alone. The traditional judicial
reasoning was that these controls were of less importance to the public welfare than those
controls protecting public health and safety, and also that they were too subjective to be
equitable.'); 1 JAMES METZENBAUM, THE LAW OF ZONING 33-34 (2d ed. 1955) (discussing several
cases holding aesthetic grounds alone insufficient for a nuisance finding).
25. Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (noting that the "exact description and
limitation of [these powers] have not been attempted by the courts').
26. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
27. As of 1996, states upholding aesthetic-based zoning laws included Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
See Ashe, supra note 16, at 76 n.54; see also Stephanie L. Bunting, Unsightly Politics: Aesthetics,
Sign Ordinances, and Homeowners' Speech in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
473 (1996) ("Aesthetic zoning regulations have become extraordinarily popular in recent
years .... The most common aesthetic ordinances by far are those that regulate signs.');
Matthew Nickerson, Signs of Times: Smaller but Tasteful, CHIcAGO TRIB., May 21, 1993, at DUl
(noting that such "regulations are becoming more attractive to many suburban governments").
While many states now allow for zoning laws based solely on aesthetics, some states still
require more legitimate justifications in connection with aesthetic-based zoning laws. As of
1996, these states included Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, Nebraska,
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia. See Ashe, supra note
16, at 76 n.55. Other, "more legitimate" justifications would be, for example, possible injury or a
common law nuisance. See, e.g., Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 191 S.E. 368, 369
(W. Va. 1937) (holding that a junk yard was not a nuisance and noting that "courts of equity
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constitutional challenges continue to attack aesthetic-based zoning
laws,28 judicial standards for relevant Due Process and Equal
Protection claims are framed by zoning-favored presumptions. '
Indeed, the regulatory power exercised by local governments within
this context, absent its irrational or arbitrary exercise, has been "one
of the least limitable. ' ' 0
A. Police Power and Aesthetics: The License
31
The term "police power" is amorphous.32 Several rights inherent
to the term are generally obvious and constant,33 but the specific limits
of municipal police powers have generally remained in flux. ' In fact,
case law reveals that the limits of police powers have been determined
have hesitated to exercise authority in the abatement of nuisances where the subject matter is
objected to by the complainants merely because it is offensive to the sight"); Pacific Rys. Adver.
Co. v. City of Oakland, 276 P. 629, 632 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1929) (concluding that the prohibition
of streetcar advertising is invalid because "no threat of public injury or danger existed... which
would warrant or justify the calling into play of an exercise of the police power in the broad and
sweeping form which this ordinance takes").
28. This Note discusses constitutional law only as it relates to the evolution of municipal
zoning power. Other constitutional issues, such as the supremacy of federal law, arise when
zoning laws are deemed to alter registered marks and thereby violate the Lanham Act. Because
this Note rejects the notion that aesthetic-based zoning laws affecting only exterior signs alter
registered marks, a discussion of these issues is not necessary. For an argument that zoning
laws should be preempted by the Lanham Act on constitutional grounds, see generally Roberta
Rosenthal Kwall, Regulating Trademarks on Exterior Signs: Should Local Law Trump the
Lanham Act and the Constitution?, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1105 (1998).
29. See infra Part ll.B.
30. See Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (The exercise of a state's police
power "may, indeed, seem harsh in its exercise, usually is on some individual, but the imperative
necessity for its existence precludes any limitation upon it when not exerted arbitrarily.").
31. An extensive collection of commentary has already addressed the evolution of police
powers and aesthetic-based zoning regulations. See, e.g., 1 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN
LAW OF ZONING 93-109 (3d ed. 1986). While the following discussion is therefore kept brief, it is
necessary because it illustrates the significance of municipal police powers not only throughout
history, but as of today, when those powers are threatened by Lanham Act preemption.
32. See 1 METZENBAUM, supra note 24, at 90 (noting that a study of case law would "reveal
the police power not as a fixed quantity, but as the expression of social, economic and political
conditions. As long as these conditions vary, the police power must continue to be elastic")
(quoting ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 3
(1904); see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (noting that "[ain attempt to define its
reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts").
33. See 1 METZENBAUM, supra note 24, at 17 (stating the police power is generally
understood to include "the right to provide for.., public safety, health and welfare, the
supplying of water, the regulation of streets and highways [etc.]").
34. See State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 196 N.W. 451, 455 (Wis. 1923) ('With the passing of
time, social standards conform to new ideals. As a race, our sensibilities are becoming more
refined, and that which formerly did not offend cannot now be endured. That which the common
law did not condemn as a nuisance is now frequently outlawed as such by the written law.").
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more by societal values than by legal precedent.35 Accordingly, the
evolution of zoning law has reflected the norms and needs of the
community," to which courts have typically deferred. 7
Although early legal decisions favored zoning laws in general,
most courts were initially hostile to even aesthetic-connected regula-
tions.38 While some courts later recognized that aesthetics might be a
consideration,39 many courts made it abundantly clear that aesthetics
alone would not suffice. 0
35. Judicial deference to community norms is underscored by the principle that zoning laws
are presumed valid until proven otherwise. See, e.g., Rotenberg v. City of Fort Pierce, 202 So. 2d
782, 785 (Fa. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) ("It is well settled that, where a[n] ... ordinance appears...
to have been regularly enacted, all presumptions will be indulged in favor of its validity."); Town
of Burlington v. Dunn, 61 N.E.2d 243, 245 (Mass. 1945) (noting that "validity (is] presumed until
the contrary is shown"); City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 3 So. 2d 364, 366 (Fla. 1941)
(en banc) (noting the "accepted rules that the court will not substitute its judgment for that of
the city council; that the ordinance is presumed valid"); see also 1 METZENBAUM, supra note 24,
at 91-93 ("[O]n account of the.., fact that new conditions are constantly calling into play new
regulations, the courts of the states as well as the federal courts have purposely refrained from
defining the limits of the 'Police Power.'").
36. In fact, Metzenbaum suggests that "(the term police power] might well be expressed as
"he Community Power."' 1 METZENBAUM, supra note 24, at 17; see also Georgette C. Poindexter,
Light, Air, or Manhattanization?: Communal Aesthetics in Zoning Central City Real Estate
Development, 78 B.U. L. REV. 445, 447 (1998) (noting that "modern zoning law has more to do...
with... 'communal aesthetics' than it has to do with harm prevention"). Although Poindexter
suggests that aesthetic-based regulations may be dangerous due to subjectivity and
unpredictability, she later submits that "courts may justify aesthetic zoning by recognizing that
it validates the collective choice of residents." Id. at 488.
37. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 32 ("[When the legislature has spoken, the public interest has
been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive .... [T]he legislature, not the judiciary, is the main
guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation... ."); see also Roger W. Badeker,
Tell it to the Judge: Appealing a Zoning Decision, J. KAN. B. ASS'N, Sept. 1998, at 33, 34
("Weighing heavily on the zoning authority's side of the scale is the presumption it has acted
reasonably.").
38. See City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 148 N.E. 842, 844 (Ohio 1925)
("Successive city councils might never agree as to what the public needs from an aesthetic
standpoint .... The world would be at continual seesaw if aesthetic considerations were
permitted to govern the use of the police power."); City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Adver.
& Sign Painting Co., 62 A. 267, 268 (N.J. 1905) ("Aesthetic considerations are a matter of luxury
and indulgence rather than of necessity, and it is necessity alone which justifies the exercise of
the police power.... ."); see also DAWSON, supra note 24, at 141 ('The owner of regulated property
could not know in advance what was expected of him; or, if that were clear, it might still be
arbitrarily determined according to some board's whim or taste."). Aesthetic-connected
regulations, separate from aesthetic-based, are those that anchor aesthetic considerations with
other traditionally recognized justifications for the exercise of police power. See infra note 40
and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 97 So. 440, 444 (La. 1923)
(indicating that the court "[did] not observe any substantial reason for saying that [aesthetic]
consideration[s] [are] not a matter of general welfare" and noting that other courts might have
rested their holdings "as logically upon the so-called aesthetic considerations as upon the
supposed other considerations of general welfare").
40. See Perlmutter v. Greene, 182 N.E. 5, 6 (N.Y. 1932) ("[Beauty] may at least shelter
herself under the wing of safety, morality, or decency."); see also Barney & Casey Co. v. Town of
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This limitation, whereby aesthetic-connected regulations were
necessarily enveloped by other, more justified zoning restrictions,
began to change with the Supreme Court's ruling in Berman v.
Parker.4 Although the case involved an action to enjoin the condem-
nation of an owner's property, Justice Douglas' remarks regarding the
concept of public welfare are pertinent:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents are
spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of
the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.
42
Subsequently, other courts began upholding aesthetic-based
zoning laws.' In 1974, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of
such regulations and, in dicta, arguably carried them a step forward."
As a result, a majority of states have since supplemented the tradi-
tional uses of zoning power with an evolving sense that aesthetics
Milton, 87 N.E.2d 9, 15 (Mass. 1949) ("Undue weight must not be given to aesthetic
considerations which can only play an incidental or ancillary role to some real, substantial, and
sufficient basis for the imposition of zoning restrictions."); General Outdoor Adver. Co. v.
Department of Pub. Works, 193 N.E. 799, 815 (Mass. 1935) ("While property owners cannot be
compelled in general to give up their rights 'for purely aesthetic objects,' yet if 'the primary and
substantive purpose of the legislation is such as justifies the act, considerations of taste and
beauty may enter in, as auxiliary.'") (quoting Welch v. Swasey, 79 N.E. 745, 746 (Mass. 1907));
Ashe, supra note 16, at 75 (noting that "aesthetic values, while not sufficient standing alone to
justify regulation, did constitute a legitimate factor for consideration... provided there was also
some other non-aesthetic public purpose").
41. See DAWSON, supra note 24, at 141 (noting that Berman is "[the case most usually cited
for the proposition that a government may regulate for beauty as well as safety and health"). See
generally Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
42. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (citation omitted).
43. See People v. Goodman, 290 N.E.2d 139, 141 (N.Y. 1972) ("It is now settled that
aesthetics is a valid subject of legislative concern and that reasonable legislation... preserving
the appearance of the community represents a valid and permissible exercise of the police
power'); State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 429 P.2d 825, 827 (Haw. 1967)'("We accept beauty as a
proper community objective, attainable through the use of the police power. We are mindful of
the reasoning of most courts that have upheld the validity of ordinances regulating outdoor
advertising and of the need felt by them to find some basis in economics, health, safety, or even
morality. We do not feel so constrained.") (citation omitted); Oregon City v. Hartke, 400 P.2d
255, 261 (Or. 1965) (en banc) ("[T]here is a growing judicial recognition of the power ... to
impose zoning restrictions ... justified solely upon the ground that they will ... prevent...
discordant and unsightly surroundings. This change in attitude is a reflection of the refinement
of our tastes and the growing appreciation of cultural values in a maturing society."); People v.
Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272, 276 (N.Y. 1963) (upholding an ordinance that prohibits the erection of a
clothesline in the front yard because it "simply proscribes conduct which is unnecessarily
offensive to the visual sensibilities of the average person").
44. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) ('The police power is not
confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where
family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a
sanctuary for people.").
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matter, if not alone, then at least in conjunction with other legitimate
justifications. 5
In any event, courts have been willing to embrace the notion
that communities value the way they look." While certain regulations
reflecting this message may come under constitutional attack, as
illustrated by the following discussion, they may also fall under the
principle that what benefits the community likewise benefits each of
its members.47
B. Due Process and Equal Protection: The Limits8
The legal evolution of this rather broad, community-based
zoning power would be only half-complete absent an exploration of
relevant constitutional challenges."' While traditionally many zoning
cases have involved issues of due process and equal protection,' these
constitutional limitations are especially pertinent to aesthetic-based
zoning laws that specifically regulate storefront signs.' The following
observation explains the basic requirements of reasonableness under
the Fourteenth Amendment, both substantively and procedurally: "
45. The Goodman court, for example, concedes that "not every artistic conformity or
nonconformity is within the regulatory ambit of the police power. Indeed, regulation in the name
of aesthetics must bear substantially on the economic, social and cultural patterns of the
community or district." Goodman, 290 N.E.2d at 142.
46. This may be explained, in part, by the fact that "authorities recognize neighborhood
aesthetics to be integrally bound to property values." City of Coral Gables v. Wood, 305 So. 2d
261, 263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
47. Cf. Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) ('There must be progress, and if
in its march private interests are in the way they must yield to the good of the community.").
48. While constitutional challenges undoubtedly impose limits on the exercise of police
power, one court has declared that police power existed prior to any constitution. See
Inhabitants of York Harbor Village Corp. v. Libby, 140 A. 382, 385 (Me. 1928) ("[Police power] is
not the offspring of constitutions. It is older than any written constitution. It is the power which
the states have not surrendered to the nation....').
49. While this Note focuses on due process and equal protection challenges to aesthetic-
based zoning, a plethora of commentary traces other constitutional concerns, including those
that come under the First and Fifth Amendments. While these challenges are extremely
relevant with respect to zoning in general (especially aesthetic-based zoning that regulates the
erection of billboards and residential signs), they are less pertinent to the narrower issue herein
presented. For an illustration of these other constitutional concerns, see generally Boos v. Barry,
485 U.S. 312 (1988) (addressing First Amendment issues) and Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (highlighting the Fifth Amendment takings issue). See also
DAWSON, supra note 24, at 141; Kwall, supra note 28, at 1158-66.
50. See 1 METZENBAUM, supra note 24, at 187.
51. See generally Lisa's Party City, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 185 F.3d 12, 16-17 (2d Cir.
1999) (holding that a zoning regulation which restricted the use of color in exterior signs in
shopping centers did not violate a franchisees' Equal Protection or Due Process rights).
52. The Fourteenth Amendment, in relevant part, states: "nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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[State laws] must be reasonable-must not disfavor some as against others in the same
class; must not create unfair discriminations; must not deprive persons of equality
before the Law; must not be so arbitrary in their terms or in their administration as to
make the granting or the withholding of permission to use property subject to the mere
will of some officials; must not deprive of time-honored procedure and rights which
have become ingrained as part of the "Law.' s
While the law generally recognizes that one may not be de-
prived of property without due process of law, it also acknowledges
that one "may be restricted in the use of it when that is necessary to
the common good."' Since aesthetic-based zoning laws effectively
regulate the use of property and not its ownership, challenges based
on Due Process alone generally struggle with a judicial reluctance to
limit otherwise appropriate municipal powers.'
Three overlapping legal doctrines' frame a court's substantive
Due Process analysis and confirm a judicial posture favoring the
validity of zoning laws.57 First, a regulation is presumed valid, and the
party attacking it has the burden of proving otherwise.' Second, a
regulation will be upheld if its validity is reasonably debatable. 9
53. See 1 METZENBAUM, supra note 24, at 187.
54. City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 3 So. 2d 364, 366 (Fla. 1941). This echoes
the notion that, especially with respect to aesthetic-based zoning regulations, use of the property,
and not its ownership, is the crux of such regulation. See 1 METZENBAUM, supra note 24, at 12
('Indeed the 'use' limitation may be said to be the cardinal and primary motif of comprehensive
zoning, not its ownership.').
55. Judicial deference to municipal zoning powers was reflected in the Florida Supreme
Coures reluctance to substitute its judgment for that of the state legislature or city councils. See
Ocean & Inland, 3 So. 2d at 366.
56. While these doctrines are literally separate, they naturally overlap and are sometimes
utilized together. Note, for example, how the second doctrine effectively increases the burden of
the first.
57. See Samuel Bufford, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: A New Majority of Jurisdictions
Authorize Aesthetic Regulation, 48 UMKC L. REV. 125, 129 (1980). Bufford suggests that these
doctrines are relevant to whether a zoning ordinance achieves its objective. He notes that "the
ordinance is given the benefit of [these] doctrines that are difficult to overcome." Id.; see also
People v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272, 275 (N.Y. 1963) ("Once it be conceded that aesthetics is a valid
subject of legislative concern, the conclusion seems inescapable that reasonable legislation
designed to promote that end is a valid and permissible exercise of the police power. If zoning
restrictions ... are to be stricken as invalid, it should be ... solely because the restrictions
constitute 'unreasonable devices of implementing community policy."') (quoting J.J. Dukeminier,
Jr., Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 218, 231 (1955)).
58. See Ocean & Inland, 3 So. 2d at 366 (noting that the ordinance is presumed valid).
59. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 4 (1974) ("[Ihe line 'which in this field
separates the legitimate from the illegitimate assumption of power is not capable of precise
delimitation .... A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, -like a pig in the
parlor instead of the barnyard .... If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning
purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.' ") (quoting
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926)).
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Third, a regulation will withstand judicial scrutiny, unless it is clearly
arbitrary and capricious.'
In Lisa's Party City, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, the Second Cir-
cuit, relying on a test that primarily reflected the first and third doc-
trines, held that the plaintiffs substantive due process rights were not
violated by an ordinance mandating that the plaintiffs mark satisfy
the requirements of the center's sign package." The court's test was
comprised of two prongs. First, the plaintiff had to "establish that it
had a valid 'property interest' in a benefit... entitled to constitutional
protection."62 Second, the plaintiff "had to show that the Town's action
in depriving it of that interest was 'so outrageously arbitrary as to be a
gross abuse of governmental authority.' "" In proving that such zoning
actions were arbitrary and irrational, the plaintiff had to prove that
there was no legitimate reason for such actionY
Under both prongs of this test, the court concluded that a zon-
ing ordinance prohibiting the display of a mark on a storefront sign
did not violate the plaintiffs Due Process rights.' Moreover, the mu-
nicipality had a legitimate reason for its decision to deny the permit,
and the plaintiff was in no way deprived of any property interest. The
plaintiffs due process attack on substance, therefore, failed."
Zoning regulations within this context also give rise to ques-
tions of equal protection." A plaintiff who attacks an ordinance on
60. In effect, this rule requires reasonableness. If a regulation is reasonable, a court is
likely to uphold it. See Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. at 395 ("1i]t must be said before the ordinance
can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable .... .'); People v. Goodman, 290 N.E.2d 139, 141 (N.Y. 1972) ("Our inquiry... is
limited to determining whether, under all the circumstances, the means adopted in this
ordinance are reasonably related to the community policy sought to be implemented. .. .';
Stover, 191 N.E.2d at 275 ("[W]hether such a statute or ordinance should be voided should
depend upon whether the restriction was 'an arbitrary and irrational method of achieving an
attractive, efficiently functioning, prosperous community . ' (quoting Dukeminier, supra
note 57, at 231).
61. See Lisa's Party City, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 185 F.3d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1999). In this
case, a zoning ordinance prevented plaintiffs from using their federally registered multi-color
trademark on their storefront sign. See id. at 13-14.
62. See id. at 17.
63. See id. (quoting Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 263 (2d Cir. 1999)). The
reasonableness inquiry is clearly reflected in the court's second prong. The first prong, however,
only reflects the other legal rules to the extent that it places the burden of proof on the plaintiff.
64. See id. (affirming the district court's holding that the Town had a legitimate reason for
the zoning regulation).
65. See id. at 17-18.
66. The court noted that sign restrictions based on aesthetics are a valid exercise of police
power. See id. at 17.
67. See id.
68. See 1 METZENBAUM, supra note 24, at 187 (suggesting that it is essential to consider
both Due Process and Equal Protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment "because [this
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equal protection grounds has the burden of showing that selective
treatment occurred, and that it was "' based on impermissible consid-
erations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise
of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a
p erson .' '"
A plaintiff must show selective treatment in comparison with
"similarly situated" individuals.7 The meaning of "similarly situated"
in effect "grandfathers in" establishments that existed prior to the
current ordinance.7 This interpretation is necessary to prevent zoning
laws from being retroactive, which is generally considered unconstitu-
tional.7 In Lisa's Party City, for example, plaintiff failed to cite even
one similarly situated establishment.' Instead, the plaintiff generally
pointed to establishments that existed long before the current ordi-
nance. 4 Thus, the plaintiffs only evidence of selective treatment
rested on comparisons with establishments that were not similarly
situated.' The court therefore held that the plaintiff "failed to show an
issue of material fact requiring trial of its equal protection claims."'"
Thus, while equal protection concerns are always present with
respect to aesthetic-based zoning laws, such claims are, like questions
of due process, subject to heavy burdens of proof and zoning-favored
presumptions. Against this backdrop, a court, in attempting to pre-
empt an otherwise valid exercise of municipal police power, must
amendment] impinges upon and so closely touches not only the provisions written into many
zoning ordinances but, also, the administration of zoning codes").
69. Lisa's Party City, 185 F.3d at 16 (quoting LaTrieste Restaurant & Cabaret Inc. v.
Village of Port Chester, 40 F.3d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d
606, 609-10 (2d Cir. 1980))). While the court in Lisa's Party City appeared to regard both prongs
of the test with equal significance, the plaintiffs failure to prove selective treatment made it easy
for the court to determine whether such treatment was in fact based on impermissible
considerations, malice, or bad faith. The court stated that "[o]n these facts, the appellant's
assertion that the Town enforced the ordinance against it with an impermissible motivation is
sheer 'conjecture and speculation' that is insufficient to withstand the Town's motion for
summary judgment." Id. at 17 (quoting Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2d Cir. 1998)).
70. Id. at 16. While the language in People v. Goodman, 290 N.E.2d 139 (N.Y. 1972), does
not explicitly include this notion of similar situations, this conclusion is a natural extension of
Goodman's rule requiring intentional discrimination. After all, such intent can only be found by
comparing the plaintiff to those who are similarly situated.
71. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 295 P. 14, 17-18 (Cal. 1930) ("Zoning... holds that an
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure .... [It] looks to the future, not the past, and it is
customary to allow buildings and businesses already in the district to remain . . . . ) (first
alteration in original) (quoting J.P. Chamberlain & S. Pierson, Zoning Laws and Ordinances, 10
A.B.A. J. 185, 185 (1924)).
72. See id. at 18.
73. See Lisa's Party City, 185 F.3d at 17.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 16.
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logically ground its decision on something other than a constitutional
challenge. To illustrate this, the next section explores the Ninth Cir-
cuit's effort to instead base its holding on the language of § 1121(b).
III. BLOCKBUSTER SIGNS AND SEMANTICS
A. District Court Decision
In 1996, Blockbuster Videos, Inc. and Video Update, Inc.77 ap-
plied to the city of Tempe, Arizona, for permits to display storefront
signs that would incorporate their registered service marks. 8 Pur-
suant to Tempe's zoning ordinance, both applications were subject to
the review and approval of the Tempe Design Review Board ("the
Board")." According to the ordinance, all exterior signs' in a shopping
center must conform to the center's specific sign package, which
regulates, inter alia, color, size, and the location of signs.' The Board
determined that Video Update's and Blockbuster's ' registered marks
fell outside the centers' sign packages and rejected their applications,
requiring both entities to display exterior signs that would comply
with the appropriate requirements.'
Blockbuster and Video Update each unsuccessfully appealed
the Board's decision to the Tempe City Council; both companies there-
after separately sued the City of Tempe.' The district court granted a
preliminary injunction, requiring Tempe to allow both companies to
77. The companies are separate entities with no connection other than the consolidation of
their respective cases. See Blockbuster Videos, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 141 F.3d 1295, 1297 (9th
Cir. 1998).
78. See id. at 1296-97. Video Update has one mark: the words "Video Update" in red
lettering which is wider at the bottom and narrower at the top. Blockbuster has two marks: a
torn ticket with a blue background and yellow lettering and a blue awning with the words
"Blockbuster Video" in yellow block letters. See id.
79. See id. at 1297.
80. While the court never explicitly defines exterior, its holding and relevant dicta indicate
that exterior means any space or area outside the actual store, even if this designated outside is
in fact part of a center's indoor walking area. See id. at 1297-1300.
81. See id. at 1297 (noting that the owner of a shopping center creates the sign package,
subject to the review and approval of the Board).
82. The Board actually approved Blockbuster's torn ticket sign, but did not allow the
installation of the awning. See id.
83. See id. The Board allowed Video Update's red letters on a sign facing the street, but it
did not allow the red letters on the exterior sign within the shopping center. This discrepancy
might exist because the specific sign package controlled only the signs within the center's
interior common area, which probably can be described as an exterior area. See id.
84. The district court consolidated the two cases. See id. at 1297.
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display their marks as registered and as requested.' Tempe appealed
the decision.'
B. The Ninth Circuit Analysis: Signs of Confusion
The Ninth Circuit, relying heavily on the plain language of the
statute itself" and in part on its legislative history,' held that
§ 1121(b) prohibits a municipality from enforcing a zoning ordinance
that requires the alteration of a registered mark.' The court noted,
however, that nothing in the statute prevents a municipality from
prohibiting a mark altogether.' The court thereby affirmed the district
court's order insofar as it precluded Tempe from altering the com-
panies' marks.9' But the court simultaneously reversed the district
court's order to the extent that the lower court left Tempe powerless.
Effectively, Tempe retained the power to completely prohibit the
mark. 2 While the practical effects of this decision are puzzling, the
legal premises on which the court bases its decision provoke further
analysis.
1. Premise Number One: Unequivocal Clarity
The Blockbuster court afforded the first clause of § 1121(b)
substantial consideration." This clause states that "[n]o State... or
any political subdivision or any agency thereof may require alteration
of a registered mark."9 The court defined "to alter" as " 'to cause to
become different in some particular characteristic... without chang-
85. See id. at 1296.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 1297 (citing Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194
(1985)).
88. The court noted that while it included an analysis of the legislative history, it need not
do so since the plain meaning of the statute was clear enough to end its inquiry. See id. at 1298
(citing Connecticut Natl Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)).
89. See id. at 1301.
90. See id.; see also infra Part III.B.2.b (explaining in greater detail the contours of this
prohibition loophole).
91. See id. Since Tempe's ordinance was, in part, deemed a requirement that vendors
modify their marks, it would therefore have to permit both companies to incorporate their
registered marks, even if diug so meant a diversion from the center's uniform design. See id. at
1300.
92. See id. (Trecluding display of a mark for zoning purposes is permissible; requiring
alteration of a mark is not.'!). This effectively allowed Tefi-pe to prohibit Blockbuster's awning
as Tempe originally desired, but simultaneously forced Tempe to allow Video Update to use its
federally-registered red lettering. See id. at 1300-01.
93. See id. at 1297-98.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1994).
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ig into something else; to change or modify.' "" The court, therefore,
concluded that a zoning ordinance requiring a vendor to comply with a
center's sign package effectively compels that vendor to change his
mark and thereby alter it under the language of § 1121(b).'
At least half of § 1121(b) seems to support the court's conclu-
sion. Once this definition is applied to the first clause of § 1121(b),
however, the second clause arguably becomes superfluous." The sec-
ond clause states that "[n]o State... or any political subdivi-
sion.., thereof may require... that additional trademarks, service
marks, trade names, or corporate names... be displayed... in a
manner differing from the display of such additional trademarks...
contemplated by the registered mark."" Any such requirement would
most likely alter a mark, as defined by the majority, and thus fall
under the general umbrella of the first clause." But this would fail to
make sense in light of the majority's clear indication that only the
second clause was written in response to Century 21.1' A literal ap-
proach to half of § 1121(b) cannot logically render the other half super-
fluous when the latter half is simultaneously purported to reflect a
distinct and separate purpose. This suggests that perhaps the ques-
tion should be not how the literal meaning of "alteration" defines the
purpose of the first clause, but rather how the purpose behind both
clauses when read together defines "alteration."'' This analysis, which
indicates that the literal meaning of the statute is not as clear as the
majority concluded, necessarily invokes an examination of the stat-
ute's legislative history."
95. See Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1297-98 (quoting WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DIcTIONARY 63 (1986)).
96. See id. at 1298.
97. The second clause is rendered superfluous because the prohibition of modification or
change to a registered mark under the first clause would encompass that which is prohibited
under the second clause. Somewhat circularly, the court addressed the second clause, but only
within the context of its legislative history, which the court already dismissed as unnecessary to
the court's holding. See id. at 1299-1301.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1121(b).
99. This assumes that the statute is already applicable to the given situation. Such
applicability inevitably depends on the purpose of the entire statute. See infra Part mI.B.2.
100. See Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1299.
101. A literal meaning of "alter," as already suggested, renders the second clause
superfluous. Thus, the "natural interpretation is that together, the two clauses were designed to
prevent alterations to registered marks of the kind required by the Nevada Real Estate Advisory
Commission." See id. at 1303 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
added).
102. See infra note 107.
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Although the Blockbuster majority acknowledged that § 1121(b)
was enacted as a result of Century 21,03 by implication the court took
the untenable position that the "plain language" of the first clause
somehow circumvented the legislative history that framed its counter-
part.'"' Judge Browning's separate opinion in Blockbuster and a New
York district court, however, avoided this separate clause distinction
and interpreted § 1121(b) as a whole according to its legislative his-
tory."5 While the majority downplayed its exploration of this history,"N
the court's subtle endeavor generally gave rise to its second premise.
2. Premise Number Two: Broad Federal Preemption
a. Revisiting Century 21: The Protagonist of the Story'
In Century 21, the court concluded that the "Lanham Act con-
tains no manifestation of a Congressional intent.., to control all
aspects of the trademark field."'0 ° The court held, therefore, that the
Nevada Real Estate Advisory Commission's regulations of Century
21's registered service mark were not in violation of the Lanham Act."°
Other states thereafter adopted similar regulations that likewise
applied to all items on which the trademark appeared: signs, business
cards, advertisements, etc."' These rules ultimately proved detrimen-
103. See Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1303 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
104. See id. at 1299 ('The first clause ... was not necessary to address the Century 21
problem because that problem was addressed by the second clause.').
105. See id. at 1303 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The
majority... inexplicably concludes that only the second clause of [the provision] was intended to
respond to the Century 21 problem. There is no support for this distinction in the language or
legislative history.'); Payless ShoeSource, Inc. v. Town of Penfield, 934 F. Supp. 540, 543
(W.D.N.Y. 1996) ('The plain language of § 1121(b) arguably supports plaintiffs position that the
Town may not require any alteration of its mark. However, the precise meaning of the term
'alteration' and whether aesthetic zoning constitutes such an alteration are not entirely clear
from the language of the statute. '[W]here the scope of a statutory provision is not made crystal
clear by the language of the provision, it is appropriate to turn to the legislative history of the
statute.'') (quoting Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1571 (2d Cir. 1985)).
106. See Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1298.
107. The majority's incidental reference to Century 21 as the protagonist of the story should
be enough reason, in itself, to explore the entire story, which would include the legislative
history. See id. ("The protagonist in the story of the enactment of section 1121(b) is Century
21 ....').
108. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Nevada Real Estate Advisory Comm'n, 448 F. Supp.
1237, 1241 (). Nev. 1978), affd mem., 440 U.S. 941, superseded by 15 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1994).
109. See id. at 1241; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
110. See Payless ShoeSource, 934 F. Supp. at 543.
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tal,"' and Congress sought to preempt these regulations with
§ 1121(b)."2
Although House Report 778 generally underscores the purpose
of § 1121(b),' legislative hearings conducted by the House Subcom-
mittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice,
which is part of the House Judiciary Committee, clarify the scope of
§ 1121(b)."' Congressman Barney Frank raised several questions
regarding the extent to which states would retain the power to enforce
their respective zoning laws."5 Congressman Jerry Patterson, author
of the bill, addressed Frank's concerns and, in doing so, summarized
the statute's scope."6 He remarked:
The legislation... is narrowly written so that it merely reaffirms the intent of the act
in that it expressly prohibits only State regulations that directly interfere with the use
of a trademark or service mark as registered. The language does not interfere with nor
question the validity of other State regulations that only indirectly affect the use of a
trademark .... 117
Thus, the meaning of "alteration" is illustrated by the distinction be-
tween direct and indirect interference and the subsequent effect this
has on the preemption of local zoning laws.'18
111. See H.R. REP. No. 97-778, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2621, 2621 ("[The
result of these regulations has been the kind of confusion in uses of trademarks from one
jurisdiction to another which the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946 was designed to eliminate.');
see also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
112. See Payless ShoeSource, 934 F. Supp. at 543.
113. See H.R. REP. No. 97-778, at 2, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2622 ('The purpose of
[this statute] is to eliminate this confusion and to restore the preemptive nature of federal
Trademark law.') (emphasis added). While the "preemptive nature of federal Trademark law"
seems to support the Blockbuster majority's analysis, the specific confusion that preemption
seeks to remedy is that which existed in Century 21. In fact, the House Report later states that
the statute would not in any way restrict the zoning or historic site protection laws or
regulations of the states. See id.
114. See Lanham Trademark Act Amendment: Hearings on H.R. 5154 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong. 5 (1982) (hereinafter "Hearings).
115. See id. at 10-11.
116. See id. at 12-13.
117. Id. at 13 (emphasis added). Senator Hatch has also pointed to this notion of "other
State regulations" during a Senate hearing regarding this amendment. See 128 CONG. REC.
25,867 (1982):
It is the traditional right of State and local governments to protect the health, welfare,
and safety of their citizens by enacting laws and ordinances designed to protect historic
landmarks, scenic beauty, and environmental quality. H.R. 5154 would not conflict with
that traditional authority since those worthy interests can be protected without
mandating alterations in federally registered trademarks.
118. See Blockbuster Videos, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 141 F.3d 1295, 1304 (9th Cir. 1998)
(Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Regulation that directly alters the
mark itself is quite different from [a] regulation that defines permissible aesthetic characteristics
for signage in specific shopping centers and affects registered trademarks only indirectly)
(emphasis added); see also Payless ShoeSource, Inc. v. Town of Penfield, 934 F. Supp. 540, 543
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Direct interference is similarly demonstrated by the facts of
Century 21. The Nevada ordinance, for example, affected more than
the mere use of a trademark; it attacked the mark itself."' Thus, a
mark holder subject to the Nevada ordinance would in effect be left
with a different mark than that which was filed with the Patent and
Trademark Office. Indeed, this mark holder would thereby possess
two marks: one that is registered, but unusable and one that is un-
registered, but required.
Indirect interference, on the other hand, affects only isolated
use of the mark, not the mark itself."o Subsequent use of the mark is
thereby unaffected."' If the Nevada ordinance, for example, required
Century 21 to display "for sale" signs at least twenty feet from the
street (maybe for purposes of safety), this law would only interfere
with its mark indirectly; Century 21 would still possess a mark that is
both registered and useable.
A distinction drawn between trademarks on the one hand and
exterior signs on the other further illustrates this point.' Simply
stated: a storefront sign is not necessarily a trademark.' It may
(W.D.N.Y. 1996) ('The section simply was not intended 'to interfere with local aesthetic or
hist[o]ric-type zoning,' but was aimed only at prohibiting the actual alteration of the mark
itself.") (quoting Hearings, supra note 114, at 10 (Statement of Rep. Barney Frank)).
119. See Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1304 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ('The term 'alteration' was used by the bill's author to describe state-mandated changes in
the mark itself, which are, of necessity, reflected in every subsequent display of that mark....").
120. See id. at 1302 ("[L]ocal aesthetic zoning regulations affect only specific, isolated
applications of federally registered trademarks... and do not alter the trademarks themselves
in a manner that is reflected whenever they are used.").
121. Subsequent use of the mark is defined here as any use of the mark other than for
purposes of exterior signage. Thus, for all other uses, a holder will be able to maintain a mark as
contemplated by his official registration. This privilege is what Nevada vendors lost in Century
21 and what Congress attempted to restore with the enactment of § 1121(b). See Payless
ShoeSource, 934 F. Supp. at 546 ('Plaintiff, unlike Century 21, can [still] use its trademark...
on its bags, boxes, stationery, letterhead, indoor displays, etc."). For an illustration of the
difference between the mark itself and its delivery vehicle, see infra note 124 and accompanying
text.
122. See Payless ShoeSource, 934 F. Supp. at 546 ("[P]laintiff has confused its sign with its
trademark. The fact that plaintiff would prefer to use its trademark as its sign should not
preclude the Town from enforcing valid aesthetic zoning regulations.").
123. See id. This immediately draws into question Blockbuster's awning: Is this protected by
trademark law? While the awning itself is not a trademark as defined herein, a blue awning
with the word "Blockbuster" written across in yellow letters is deemed Blockbuster's "trade
dress," which in itself is a mark which can be protected. Clearly, other vendors are capable of
using awnings, probably even those which are blue. But Blockbuster's specific blue awning
displaying the words "Blockbuster Video" in yellow letters would be off limits to other vendors.
See SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that "[a] product's
'trade dress' . . . may also be protected"); Sheldon H. Klein, Introduction to Trademarks, in
UNDERSTANDING BASIC TRADEMARK LAw 1998, at 9, 14 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks &
Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G-528, 1998) (illustrating that "trade dress"
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incorporate a trademark, similar to other items on which the mark
appears, but such incorporation does not automatically protect the
delivery vehicles on which the mark is carried."4 Moreover, this notion
reflects well-settled law that a municipality, pursuant to its police
power, may regulate local aesthetics. 1" The incidental displacement of
one, albeit noticeable, delivery vehicle1" does not preempt local zoning
powers."? An opposite conclusion would necessarily render aesthetic
zoning meaningless.'
b. Avoiding the Purpose: Blockbuster's Own "Can of Worms"
Blockbuster's analysis of § 1121(b)'s legislative history is gen-
erally tainted by two diversions. First, the court avoided addressing
the obvious implications of the statute's legislative history by im-
plicitly concluding that an absence of statutory language in support of
limited preemption thereby revealed an opposite intent.m Second, the
court escaped the guidance of legislative hearings by drawing a
includes such things as "package designs, product configurations, [and] restaurant decor").
Although the majority held that Tempe could properly prohibit the awning, the underpinnings of
the court's argument are dubious at best. See infra text accompanying notes 154-61.
124. Delivery vehicle is herein defined as anything on which the mark is attached or with
which it is connected. See Payless ShoeSource, 934 F. Supp. at 546. For example, a business card
on which a mark appears is the delivery vehicle for that mark.
125. See, e.g., People v. Goodman, 290 N.E.2d 139, 141 (N.Y. 1972) (A "[s]tate and its political
subdivisions may regulate the erection and maintenance of outdoor advertising under the police
power. It is now settled that aesthetics is a valid subject of legislative concern and that
reasonable legislation designed to promote the governmental interest in preserving the
appearance of the community represents a valid and permissible exercise of the police power.');
see also Suffolk Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Hulse, 373 N.E.2d 263, 265 (N.Y. 1977); 128 CONG. REC.
25,869 (1982) ('The legislation was carefully drafted so as to avoid any conflict with the
traditional state right to regulate such matters.'). For a more detailed discussion of municipal
zoning powers, see generally Part H.
126. While such displacement may be annoying to vendors, they are presumably aware of the
particular sign packages prior to applying for zoning permits. The problem emerges only when
vendors insist that they "ha[ve] the absolute right to use [their] trademark[s] as [their] outdoor
sign[s] regardless of the Town's uniform sign regulations." Payless ShoeSource, 934 F. Supp. at
546.
127. Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1304 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
('Those who testified before the House Subcommittee uniformly agreed that under Section
1121(b), state and local governments would continue to be free to enforce aesthetic zoning
restrictions applicable to signage, even if that regulation affected the display of registered
trademarks.'). Congressman Patterson stated that the "'legislation is not intended to limit the
right of States to regulate signs.., merely because they may involve registered trademarks.'"
Id. (quoting Hearings, supra note 114, at 13).
128. Payless ShoeSource, 934 F. Supp. at 546 ("If a proprietor's preference could defeat
regulations such as this, virtually all aesthetic zoning would be ineffectual.').
129. See Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1298. While this conclusion more explicitly turns upon the
clarity of the statute, the court implicitly conveyed that there was an obvious absence of any
language regarding limited preemption.
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dubious distinction between prohibition and alteration.' As explained
below, this distinction ironically allows municipalities to draft zoning
regulations in a way that effectively harm both the vendor and the
consumer. 131
The first diversion is caused by the court's reliance on a famil-
iar principle: "when Congress wants to make its intentions clear, it
does so in the language of the statute."1 32 The court pointed to a provi-
sion of the Copyright Act to illustrate its point.1 3' The provision states,
in relevant part, that "[n]othing in this title annuls or limits any
rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State
with respect to... State and local landmarks, historic preservation,
[or] zoning.' ' 3 The court inferred that since Congress enacted this
provision to insure that the Copyright Act would not affect states'
zoning powers, it would have written a similar exemption in § 1121(b)
to effect the same intent.
135
Close examination, however, reveals the weakness of this in-
ference. As enacted, § 301(b)(4) more specifically states that nothing
within the Copyright Act will annul or limit zoning rights "relating to
architectural works protected under [17 U.S.C.] section 102(a)(8)."'" In
interpreting this section, the Blockbuster court not only failed to in-
clude the latter part of this provision in its analysis, but it conven-
iently excluded any discussion of the Architectural Works Copyright
Protection Act ("AWCPA"), the vehicle by which the provision came
into existence.
131
The AWCPA amended the Copyright Act by establishing, for
the first time, federal copyright protection for architectural works.'
38
While the AWCPA sought to fully protect works of architecture, 39 the
130. See id. at 1300.
131. See infra Part III.B.2.c.i (using a hypothetical to illustrate the point).
132. Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1299.
133. See id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(4) (1994)).
134. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b).
135. See Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1299.
136. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(4) (emphasis added).
137. See generally Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1295; see also 17 U.S.C. 101-02, 120 (1994).
138. See Raleigh W. Newsam, H1, Architecture and Copyright-Separating the Poetic From
the Prosaic, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1073, 1076 (1997) (noting that the "purpose underlying the passage
of the [AWCPA] [was] to bring the United States into full compliance with the Berne Convention
by creating a new category of copyright subject matter for architectural works) (footnotes
omitted).
139. See 136 CONG. REc. 1733, 1733 (1990) (statement of Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier)
(stating that "[t]reaty obligations are solemn undertakings" and that "all Copyright Office
experts agreed: the Berne Convention requires protection for works of architecture, and U.S. law
should be amended to expressly so provide).
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scope of its protection was effectively quite limited."0 Against the
backdrop of these limitations, Congress included § 301(b)(4) to protect
zoning interests not for the sake of zoning interests, but for the sake of
architectural works."' Thus, the absence of similar language in
§ 1121(b) does not imply that Congress intended for broad Lanham
Act preemption; it only reveals that Congress chose not to import the
language of one act into another."4
The court's second diversion from the obvious implications of
§ 1121(b)'s legislative history is fueled by a reliance on the less obvious
distinction between prohibition and alteration.4 The court relied on
140. See Raphael Winick, Note, Copyright Protection for Architecture After the Architectural
Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 41 DUKE L.J. 1598, 1622 (1992) (pointing to the ways in
which the AWCPA limits the copyright holder's derivative work right).
141. See id. at 1623-24.
The AWCPA severely limits the copyright holder's derivative works right .... Congress
viewed this limitation as a practical necessity. In order to perform its utilitarian
functions, a building must be able to adapt and change. Conditioning changes on the
approval of the original architect may lead to frustrating delays .... [L]ocal landmark
and historic preservation laws will protect a work whose aesthetic appearance is
considered too valuable to alter. Local landmark and historic preservation laws are an
often overlooked, but increasingly important, legal protection for architectural works.
These laws will help make up for the AWCPA's failure to prevent alteration or
modification of the buildings thought by the local community to be of the most aesthetic
or historic worth. The AWCPA explicitly upholds such local laws .... As a practical
matter, this means that state law will continue to play an important role in regulating
the construction, modification, and destruction of architectural works.
142. See Blockbuster Videos, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 141 F.3d 1295, 1305 (9th Cir. 1998)
(Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he majority was wrong to draw an
inference regarding the absence of an exemption in the Lanham Act from the presence of an
exemption in the Copyright Act."). The weakness of the inference may explain why the majority
offered only a brief analysis regarding congressional intent. See id. at 1299.
143. See id. at 1298. The majority's insistence on separating these concepts creates a
phenomenon this Note will describe as the prohibition loophole. See infra Part 1mI.B.2.c.i-ii
(illustrating the impact of the prohibition loophole).
Judge Browning found that this distinction also created a division between zoning laws that
regulate architectural features and those that regulate only color. See Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at
1303 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The former would be possible
because a town could prohibit it altogether; the latter would not be possible because a change in
color would be an alteration and, therefore, a violation of the Lanham Act. While this Note
advocates Judge Browning's position, insofar as it recognizes the limits of Lanham Act
preemption, it rejects the architecturecolor distinction. Careful review of the majority's opinion
reveals that the court never made this distinction. See id. at 1298-1300. The court clearly
indicated that a municipality is free to decide whether and where all signs may be placed.
Therefore,'according to the majority, prohibition of marks-whether in the form of architecture
or color-is permissible. See id.
Professor Kwall argues that there is a distinction between "less established trademarkable
properties," such as size and shape, and more "mainstream trademarkable properties," such as
color and lettering. See Kwall, supra note 28, at 1146. The former, according to Kwall, should
invoke broad Lanham preemption, while the latter should not be preempted at all. See id. While
this argument seems consistent with the outcome in Blockbuster, it is dubious at best, because
the majority clearly held that a municipality could prohibit all marks. The majority noted that
"allowing a municipality to regulate storefront signs in the way Tempe seeks to regulate
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the assumption that a broad zoning exception to § 1121(b) would in
effect defeat the purpose of the Lanham Act."" To illustrate this point,
the court briefly explored the nature of the trademark in general and
the need for its protection. 4' In doing so, it emphasized the connection
between the trademark itself and its visibility."' Moreover, it sug-
gested that "[i]n order for a trademark to be a symbol that customers
will recognize, it must have a uniform appearance, not only in design,
but also in color."'' 7
Although these notions of visibility and uniformity-facets of
trademark law that are advantageous to both the consumer and the
vendor-are not underestimated, the court's distinction between pro-
hibition and alteration actually undermines their role.' While the
impact of Blockbuster's holding the answer to this question inevitably
depends on how municipalities in the Ninth Circuit respond to this
distinction,'" it is already clear that it does not fit squarely within the
appellees' signs .. . would allow [it] to require a change in the appellees' registered service
marks .... We hold that a zoning ordinance may not require a change in a... mark. [It] may,
however, preclude the display of a mark...." Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1300 (emphasis added).
The majority, therefore, made no distinction between types of marks. The only distinction
drawn by the court was rooted "in the way" Tempe drafted its regulation. Tempe impermissibly
drafted a requirement with respect to Video Update, but it legally drafted a prohibition with
respect to Blockbuster. See id.
144. See id. at 1299 ("[T]he purpose of the Lanham Act [is] to protect the goodwill created by
using a uniform mark and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing
producers.'); see also Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Nevada Real Estate Advisory Comm'n, 448
F. Supp. 1237, 1241 (D. Nev. 1978) (explaining in part the purpose of the Lanham Act), affd
mem., 440 U.S. 941, superseded by 15 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1994).
145. See Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1300 ("A trademark is a symbol, which carries customer
recognition and goodwill: 'The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the
psychological function of symbols.' ') (quoting Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S.
Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942)).
146. The court explained:
If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them ....
The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by making every effort to
impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol.
Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same-to convey through the mark, in the
minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which [the mark]
appears.
Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1300 (quoting Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen, 316 U.S. at 205).
147. Id.
148. Once the court allowed for the prohibition of a mark, its arguments for the usefulness of
trademarks as visible symbols with which consumers connect become less convincing. See infra
Part m1H.B.2.c.i (using a hypothetical to show the extent to which the prohibition loophole
undermines the court's otherwise valid conclusions regarding the usefulness of trademarks).
149. After all, some municipalities may interpret the court's holding by drawing on Judge
Browning's distinction between color and architecture. See Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1303
(Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). They may believe that they can
prohibit marks that are only architectural in nature. This, however, would be drawing
distinctions between trade dress and trademarks, and the court never embraced such differences.
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purpose of trademarks as set out by the court."w Further consideration
of the distinction itself will clarify this conclusion and explain why a
limited application of § 1121(b) is therefore the correct approach for
two interests invariably in conflict.
The court acknowledged Congressman Frank's concerns
regarding possible preemption of aesthetic and historic zoning laws. '
The court stated, however, that Frank's concerns were adequately
addressed by his own statement that a vendor might be barred from
displaying its mark on exterior signage: " 'They could say, 'real estate'
outside; inside the protected registered trademark would be
allowed.' "5 This, the court noted, illustrates the difference between
prohibition and alteration. The former reflects merely a passive law
that in no way affects the mark, while the latter affirmatively requires
the mark to change.1"
The court's characterization of Frank's statement as the
answer to his question suggests that the court would endorse what
might be called prohibition by substitution." Prohibition by sub-
stitution allows municipalities to prohibit the vendor from displaying
its registered mark on its exterior sign," while permitting the vendor
to use a generic substitute."M
See supra note 143 (elaborating on this Note's rejection of any distinction between color and
architecture).
150. On the one hand, the court explained the significance of trademarks, drawing largely on
the notion of visibility. But on the other hand, the court provided a way for municipalities to
easily destroy that visibility. In its attempt to balance trademark interests against zoning
interests, the court ultimately made it harder for both to achieve their objectives. Trademark
interests are hurt by the prohibition loophole; zoning interests face the preemption of any
regulation not labeled a prohibition. See infra note 159. According to Blockbuster, a municipality
simply must draft its regulations with the proper language in order to avoid preemption. While
this seems to ultimately benefit zoning interests, the practical effect is equally detrimental to
them. See infra text accompanying notes 168-69. Under the court's holding, therefore, both sides
inevitably lose.
151. See Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1299.
152. Id. (quoting Hearings, supra note 114, at 11).
153. See Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1299.
154. Outright prohibition is also possible; the court's order allowing Tempe to prohibit
Blockbuster's awning might be considered an example of outright prohibition. But the practical
effects of this sort of prohibition are puzzling. If a vendor only has one mark (for example, the
business's name) and wishes to display that mark via an exterior sign, its outright prohibition
would render the vendor signless. While the court explicitly states that "a state ... remains free
to regulate where and whether signs may be placed and how large they may be," the court's later
acknowledgement and interpretation of Frank's statement, coupled with the practical dilemmas
that a signless vendor (and consumers) would face, support the more practical notion of
prohibition by substitution. Id. (emphasis added).
155. As noted above, the sign's incorporation of the mark may in effect be the entire sign, in
which case it may be deemed trade dress. See supra note 123.
156. The mark itself, therefore, remains unaltered. Recall that the exterior sign is not the
mark itself, but one of many delivery vehicles. See supra note 124. When trade dress serves as
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The implications for subsequent interpretations of this alterna-
tive are obvious: if a municipality permits only generic lettering, this
zoning regulation may be said to require generic signs or, simul-
taneously, prohibit non-generic ones.57 According to the court, the
former, constituting alteration, would presumably be forbidden while
the latter, constituting prohibition, would generally be allowed." As
the court's distinction is swallowed by semantics, its justifications for
broad Lanham preemption are likewise defeated.
Ultimately, prohibition by substitution might be better de-
scribed as a prohibition loophole" that in effect actually undermines
the tenets of trademark law revered by the majority." While this
alone might suggest that mere conflict between zoning interests on
one hand and trademark interests on the other should not auto-
matically trigger broad Lanham preemption, a more convincing reason
might be that vendors are more threatened by the prohibition loophole
than by otherwise legitimate zoning regulations.16" ' The following hypo-
thetical illustrates this point.
c. Video Plus: A Tale of Two Cities
Assume Video Plus ("Video"), a store that sells and rents videos
and all types of electronic equipment, wishes to do business in Hope-
less, Arizona and Hopeful, New York. It applies to the Zoning Board
(the "Board" or "Boards" of both towns, respectively) for permission to
the only exterior sign, the so-called sign itself would theoretically be the mark. Like other
trademarks, however, it remains separate from its delivery vehicle and therefore interacts
similarly with zoning law. For example, assuming that Blockbuster's only registered mark is its
awning, the awning would be the mark while the delivery vehicle would be the building on which
the awning is attached. A regulation that prohibits use of the awning on the building has the
same effect of a regulation that prohibits use of a mark on a building's sign. That effect should
be characterized not as alteration, but as displacement, a result that is common in zoning
regulation. See supra text accompanying note 128.
157. Judge Browning's separate opinion concured with the majority's prohibition of
Blockbuster's awning, but not because it is a prohibition rather than an alteration. This
distinction, Browning argued, is purely semantic: while the majority's holding rested on the fact
that Blockbuster was prohibited from doing one thing while Video Update was required to do
another, "[iut could just as easily be said that Tempe required that Blockbuster display a flat sign
and prohibited Video Update from using colors other than white." Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1303
(Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
158. See id. at 1299-1300.
159. Prohibition is a loophole because it allows a town to escape the preemptive effect of the
Lanham Act if its zoning regulations are dubbed prohibitions rather than requirements.
Effectively, the court's error not only made the court's holding easily avoidable, but it left the
mark holder (and even the consumer) in perhaps a worse position. See infra Part III.B.2.c.i-ii.
160. See Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1300.
161. See supra Part II (explaining that zoning laws have a presumption of validity).
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display its mark as registered: the word "Video" in bright orange
stylized lettering set against a bright yellow and much larger "plus"
symbol. The Boards of both towns, noting their long-standing regula-
tions, deny Video the permit.
At this point the fate of Video's business essentially becomes a
function of geography. The following differences in the judicial land-
scape indicate the extent that broad Lanham preemption would be
detrimental to vendors.
i. Hopeless, Arizona: The Prohibition Loophole
In denying Video its permit, the Board of Hopeless, Arizona
reminds Video that it prohibits all signs that are not aesthetically
uniform with the town's historic design.'62 Accordingly, the Board
informs Video that a generic sign on its storefront could serve as a
substitute.'" The proposed generic sign will simply state: "Videos.'"
While the displacement of Video's mark'" is not literally
required by this regulation,'" the Board's treatment of it through
prohibition by substitution produces a similar result. After all, forbid-
ding Video from incorporating its mark on its storefront sign neces-
sarily requires it to do something else, such as accepting the sign
package and thereby choosing to display the generic alternative.67
Further consideration reveals the more subtle effects of this prohi-
bition loophole.
The only sign Video can presumably hang is one that reads:
"Videos."'68 While Video is able to display its mark within the store, it
162. See Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1300 ("Precluding display of a mark for zoning purposes is
permissible . . . . ). This hypothetical illustrates the inherent connection between aesthetic
uniformity and historic design. A sign or construction that falls outside the realm of historic
design will fail to be aesthetically uniform. Thus, although these regulations pursue separate
goals, their enforcement logically overlap.
163. See id.
164. Generally, any substitute under the Blockbuster court's reasoning will have to be
genuinely generic. Simply writing "Video Plus" in generic lettering would not be generic enough
for these purposes because 'Video Plus" written in any style or font other than that contemplated
by its official registration is an alteration, which according to the majority would be in violation
of the Lanham Act. See id.
165. Recall that the hypothetical mark, as registered, is the word "video" in bright orange
lettering against a bright yellow "plus" symbol.,
166. Recall that if such displacement were required by the regulation, it would be preempted
by Blockbuster. The point is that even though displacement was not in fact required, the effect of
prohibition by substitution logically required at least two things from Video: inaction with
respect to its registered mark and a decision with respect to the mark's generic substitute.
167. Video's only other alternative is a signless storefront, and this clearly was not the intent
of Congress or the court.
168. See supra note 164.
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will be of little help for the uninformed consumers who wish to shop at
Video Plus but assume that "Videos" is merely a video rental store. It
may take weeks, maybe months, before Hopeless residents realize, by
way of costly advertisements, that "Videos" is in fact a Video Plus
store.169
ii. Hopeful, New York: A Zoning Exception
Hopeful, New York is similar to Hopeless, Arizona in that it too
regulates zoning pursuant to considerations of historic design and
aesthetic uniformity." But when Video is denied a permit to display
its mark as registered, the Board does not employ this curious prohi-
bition by substitution. Instead, it reminds Video of the simple style
and subtle colors used by all of Hopeful's vendors, and grants Video a
permit upon its acceptance of this uniform sign package.
Although Video must in effect substitute the display of its
mark with a sign that simply states "Video Plus," this latter display
does not in any way alter Video's original mark, which is noticeably
displayed throughout the store and on its shopping bags. Indeed,
Video's registered mark remains completely intact. Moreover, con-
sumers who want audio equipment may be motivated by the exterior
sign that clearly indicates the word "plus" to at least enter the store,
wherein they are introduced to--or perhaps reacquainted with-the
Video Plus franchise.17' In either case, the result is that the store will
benefit from its trademark while the community, for a variety of rea-
sons, 172 continues to maintain its aesthetic uniformity. The tenets of
169. This assumes that the advertisements exist and are effective.
170. For a description of the presumptive importance of the aesthetic-based zoning
regulations, see supra Part II.
171. The words "Video Plus", while not displayed as federally registered, may nevertheless
spark a connection for the consumer who is already familiar with the franchise. See Leonard D.
DuBoff, What's in a Name: The Interplay Between the Federal and Trademark Registries and
State Business Registries, 6 DEPAuL Bus. L.J. 15, 15 (1993) ("The importance of a name to a
business cannot be overemphasized. Sales, goodwill, and perhaps the survival of a business
depend, to some extent, upon the business name.").
Recall Congressman Frank's concerns with the possible enactment of § 1121(b). See supra
text accompanying note 152. While his statement supports use of a generic substitute and,
logically, a prohibition loophole, this Note highlighted his remarks only in furtherance of the
argument that a municipality may enforce aesthetic-based zoning regulations. Moreover, it
served to introduce the courts distinction between alteration and prohibition, thereby reflecting
what this Note has labeled the prohibition loophole. See Blockbuster Videos, Inc. v. City of
Tempe, 141 F.3d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir. 1998).
172. Some of these reasons are discussed supra in Part fl.A. For a specific example, see
supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
[Vol. 53:717
TRADEMARKALTERATION
trademark law, therefore, may be more protected by an implied zoning
exception to the Lanham Act than by a preemptive-based loophole.
IV. REDEFINING ALTERATION: THE REPLACEMENT MODEL
In Blockbuster, the Ninth Circuit held that § 1121(b) restricts a
municipality from enforcing a zoning ordinance that requires a vendor
to use an exterior sign that conforms with the center's sign package.'
The court concluded that this resulted in the alteration of a registered
mark and therefore violated the Lanham Act.' The court defined "to
alter" as " 'to cause to become different in some particular charac-
teristic.., to change or modify.' " The court noted, however, that a
municipality remained free to prohibit marks altogether.'7" Since the
court construed Tempe's ordinance as in part a requirement to modify
a mark and in part a prohibition from erecting one, only the latter
survived attack.' Thus, Tempe could do nothing to prevent Video
Update from displaying its mark as registered.' 8 It could, however,
prohibit Blockbuster from erecting its awning. 9
Thus, according to the Blockbuster court, a mark on a store-
front sign is "alter[ed]" whenever a zoning ordinance displaces it,
unless such displacement is the result of prohibition." And by
necessity, prohibition of a mark usually results in the use of a generic
substitute.8' This substitution inevitably reflects the difference
between what the Blockbuster court wanted to achieve and what it
actually accomplished.
173. See Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1300.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 1297-98 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 63
(1986)).
176. See id. at 1300. Thus, the court's definition of alteration does not include prohibition.
177. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 154-61 (describing the effects of the
prohibition loophole).
178. See Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1301.
179. See id.
180. See supra Part HI.B.2.b. The court's definition of alteration, therefore, includes
displacement to the extent that such displacement is not the product of prohibition.
181. This theory of prohibition by substitution, discussed supra text accompanying notes 154-
61, is complicated in Blockbuster by the fact that the court allowed for the prohibition of an
architectural feature that had no substitute. Recall, however, that Blockbuster had two marks;
the prohibition of one ,mark did not render Blockbuster signless. If the awning were
Blockbuster's only mark, it probably would have been substituted by a generic sign that
conformed to the center's sign package. The point here is that the prohibition in Blockbuster is
not limited to architectural features. Even a mark on a sign, implicit in the court's holding, may
be prohibited. See Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1300.
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The court wanted to achieve two goals. First, it sought to en-
sure that federally registered trademarks were not replaced with
locally mandated new marks. Second, it wanted municipalities to
retain their power to zone, at least to the extent that such power was
not preempted by the Lanham Act. In pursuit of these ends, however,
the court created the prohibition loophole and, in effect, undermined
its own holding.
A more refined definition of alteration would be one that in-
cludes acts of replacement, but excludes all acts of displacement.
While this distinction bears the risk of likewise being labeled purely
semantic, it seems to overcome Blockbuster's shortcomings and inevi-
tably comports with the purpose of § 1121(b) and the power of munici-
pal zoning, respectively.
While the terms "displace" and "replace" are similar and, by at
least one account, synonymous," they can be viewed, at least for these
purposes, as different. "Displace" is herein defined as to take X away
and place it somewhere else, while "replace" is herein defined as to
place Y in X's spot. The focus of displacement is on simply moving X to
a new spot, while the focus of replacement takes a more drastic step: it
places Y where X once was. Thus displacement, as defined here, leaves
open an empty spot for a zoning regulation to ultimately fill. Replace-
ment, on the other hand, ushers in the new with little regard for the
old; indeed, under the replacement model, Y is the focus while X is, at
most, the fossil.
Displacement within this context would be permissible as the
mark is simply moved from one spot to another. It is temporary in
nature, and the zoning regulations focus not on the mark, but on the
need to fill an empty spot left by the mark's non-conforming nature.1"
Replacement, on the other hand, would be impermissible, as the mark
would be permanently shoved aside (if not entirely obliterated) for a
new mark, one that would prevail in all subsequent uses of the mark,
not only on the storefront sign.
Replacement of the mark is essentially what happened when
the Nevada Real Estate Advisory Commission regulated Century 21's
mark."M While clear substitution of the mark is not readily apparent in
182. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 400, 1157 (3d ed. 1982) (defining
both terms using the word "supplant?).
183. This focus, not on the mark, but on the goals of the community, is reflected in Judge
Browning's observation that "[t]he regulations are not directed at the marks at all, but at
aesthetic considerations affecting the shopping centers and the public." Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at
1302 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
184. See supra note 5.
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Century 21, all subsequent use of it was nonetheless quite blatantly
regulated." It is this sort of regulation that Congress defined as al-
teration and sought to prevent by enacting § 1121(b)." Broad federal
preemption, therefore, should be triggered not by mere displacement,
but rather by replacement-where, for example, a regulation modifies
the original mark as to create a new mark.'87 This would effectively
limit the application of § 1121(b) to marks that are in danger of really
being changed.
Crucial to this replacement model definition is the recognition
that a mark, itself, is separate from the sign that delivers it.' Dis-
placement of the mark, arising from zoning laws intended to impact a
delivery vehicle, not the mark itself, is therefore only indirect contact
with the mark. A mark holder is free to use his original mark in any
other acceptable way and in connection with any other acceptable
delivery vehicle." This ability to displace a mark effectively permits
the community as a whole to regulate storefront signs and simulta-
neously protect the integrity of marks held by some of its members.'"
In this way, the community can value its appearance without com-
pletely frustrating the purpose of trademark law.9
The definition of "alteration," for purposes of § 1121(b), should
therefore read as follows: To replace with something of a permanent
and all-inclusive nature; to change or modify as to affect every subse-
quent use. Any definition that requires less than this runs counter to
what is otherwise an obvious reflection of congressional intent and a
legitimate and constitutional exercise of municipal police power.
185. See Payless ShoeSource, Inc. v. Town of Penfield, 934 F. Supp. 540, 543 (W.D.N.Y. 1996)
(noting the long, non-exclusive list of items to which the regulation applied).
186. See Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1302 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
187. Consequently, the original mark would be useless and therefore invaluable. This result
would undermine the Lanham Act.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 122-28.
189. See supra text accompanying note 121.
190. Any assessment of the value of a mark is somewhat subjective. One may argue that the
value of the mark declines when even one otherwise legitimate use of the mark is restricted due
to zoning laws. This could have been one of Blockbuster's leading policy arguments. But the
valuation of trademarks is beyond the scope of this Note. It is sufficient here to recognize that
while value itself may be affected, the original mark, as contemplated in the official documents,
remains untouched.
191. While displacement limits some visibility between the mark and the consumer, it is
arguably less detrimental than the prohibition loophole to both parties as illustrated by the
hypothetical. See supra Part I.B.2.c. From the perspective of protecting trademarks,




In response to the Century 21 decision, Congress amended the
Lanham Act by enacting § 1121(b)."' While the purpose of this
amendment was to "eliminate... confusion and... restore the pre-
emptive nature of federal Trademark law,' '93 the extent to which both
clauses of § 1121(b) restored preemption was clearly limited.'" Indeed,
the language of the statute, coupled with its legislative history, sup-
port this narrow construction.9 '
Twenty years later, the Ninth Circuit created what might be
regarded as the Blockbuster dilemma.' Unlike its predecessor,'97
which caused the replacement of franchisors' marks and subsequently
dampened the franchisor-franchisee relationship,' Blockbuster, in
effect, required a complete overhaul of municipal zoning power.'"
While this power has expanded dramatically despite various constitu-
tional constraints,' ® the restrictions imposed by Blockbuster set forth a
dubious future for state zoning boards."
Congress did not enact § 1121(b) to restrict zoning interests in
this way. As noted by Judge Browning's separate opinion in Block-
buster, "[t]he ultimate balance struck by Congress was to prohibit
state and local governments from actually requiring the alteration of
the registered marks themselves, while preserving local government
power to restrict or prohibit particular applications of registered
marks."' Indeed, the remedy for one extreme ultimately gave rise to
another, and either Congress or the Court will bear the task of bal-
192. Even the Blockbuster majority conceded that Congress enacted § 1121(b) in response to
Century 21. See Blockbuster Videos, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 141 F.3d 1295, 1298 (9th Cir. 1998).
193. H.R. REP. No. 97-778, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2621, 2622.
194. See id.
195. See supra Part III.B.
196. See Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1299-1300.
197. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Nevada Real Estate Advisory Comm'n, 448 F. Supp
1237 (D. Nev. 1978), aff'd mem., 440 U.S. 941, superseded by 15 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1994).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
199. The extent of this overhaul depends on the response to the Blockbuster holding.
Nevertheless, a municipality's power to zone will often be at the mercy of federal trademark law.
200. See supra Part H.B.
201. While the prohibition loophole effectively gives the municipality an escape hatch,
carefully drafted prohibitions may later be regarded as disguised requirements.
202. Blockbuster Videos, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 141 F.3d 1295, 1306 (9th Cir. 1998)
(Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the "majority opinion...
seriously disturb[ed] that balance).
* I am indebted to Paul Fancher and Rob Strayer for their brilliant work in the editing of
this Note. Special thanks to my family, for their support, and to Barbara Minar, for her undying
attention, patience, and love. This Note is dedicated to my mother, Dolores Strouse, for
insisting, above all else, that I write.
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ancing, once again, these invariably conflicting interests. To that end,
this Note articulates a narrow interpretation of § 1121(b) and encour-
ages a restriction of its application to situations that are characteristic
of Century 21.
Jeffrey W. Strouse*

